Abstract-Cyber-physical social system (CPSS) plays an important role in both the modern lifestyle and business models, which significantly changes the way we interact with the physical world. The increasing influence of cyber systems and social networks is also a high risk for security threats. The objective of this paper is to investigate associated risks in CPSS, and a hybrid Bayesian risk graph (HBRG) model is proposed to analyze the temporal attack activity patterns in dynamic cyberphysical social networks. In the proposed approach, a hidden Markov model is introduced to model the dynamic influence of activities, which then be mapped into a Bayesian risks graph (BRG) model that can evaluate the risk propagation in a layered risk architecture. Our numerical studies demonstrate that the framework can model and evaluate risks of user activity patterns that expose to CPSSs.
also a high risk for the online security threats or attacks. The social network also makes cyber attackers easier to exploit vulnerabilities, and it is being weaponized by the attackers [7] .
With the increasing usage of social networks and the emergence of new technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), big data, cloud computing, and the security issues in social networks face novel research problems and challenges [2] , [5] , [7] . The hundreds of millions of users are facing security threats, such as cybercrimes, identity stolen, device/social profile hacked, overconfidence, and so on. Effective risk evaluation should be provided to help the social network platforms and users well understand the security situation they are facing, and accordingly, security and privacy protection solutions should be developed to help the users stay safe online [8] , [9] . In the past decade, a lot of research efforts have been done on the security of social networks, including security risk analysis, abnormal activities detection, cybercrimes, terrorist attacks, malicious users or device detections, shortened or hidden URL, etc., to reduce the potential threats that the users facing. In fact, most users often woefully unaware of most security threats or attacks they are facing [9] . It is reported in [10] that there is 70% of increase in scams (such as hidden URLs, phishing requests, etc.) in social networks, which spreads rapidly since most users more often like or reshare links or information posted by their friends. However, when a user profile is compromized, the attacker can also spread the scams rapidly. In some cases, the scammers embraced some popular dating applications (app), or some adult-themed contents, or links to attract more clicks from users [11] .
Many social system security vulnerabilities are exposed to attackers without knowing by the users. The most common vulnerabilities can be summarized into the following five categories: 1) careless profile leakage; 2) dumpster diving, the attacker can compromize user identity with information provided by the user itself; 3) information that can be used to attack your profile, such as hints to help guess your password; 4) links to malware; and 5) corporate spies and activist stalkers. Meanwhile, in commercial areas, many methods have been developed to collect user messages that can break the defenses, the emerging technologies, such as deep learning, cloud computing, big data, etc., can be effective to do this. The social networks have become a new source of risks and poor security protection can put the users at serious risks.
In [12] , the Federal Bureau of Investigation highlighted that the social network Facebook scamming has become the most common form of malware distributed in 2016. The social systems, such as Facebook, Twitter, etc., are increasingly an effective tool for cybercriminals, terrorist groups like Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The social systems security are facing severe' security challenges. 1) Most social systems are unable to secure the environment for users. It is reported that 2% of the Facebook and 5% of Twitter monthly average users are "false accounts" [12] , [13] , which means that the social network platforms are unable to provide a reliable system to identify duplicated or fraudulent accounts. 2) Social network scamming is highly effective and lucrative. Only less than 20% of scams can be spotted by the professional users [12] , [14] , [15] . The social networks are becoming the new cyber weapons of choice for cybercriminals. The social networks provide unreliable "trustiness" for users, which may result in rampant scams spread rapidly. The high volume of visible social network scams makes it difficult for a security expert to deal with. 3) Social networks and its data are weaponizing by the cybercriminals. Cyber attackers/criminals can easily target specific victims through social networks. For example, the LinkedIn was a key recon tool for the cybercriminals who executed the Anthem data breach and its 80 million stolen records. The Twitter was the target of an innovative malware exploit dubbed "hammertoss," which is rumored to be connected to Pentagon's data breach last summer that took down the security agency's 4200 employee email server for two weeks [16] , [17] . The main contributions in this paper are: 1) to develop a hybrid risk analysis model in cyber-physical social systems (CPSSs), in which a hidden Markov model (HMM) is introduced to model the dynamic user activities that can cause potential risks. The HMM model takes into account the aggregated influences of activities of neighbors (such as followers, friends, etc.) that can affect the activities of a user; 2) a Bayesian risks graph (BRG) model is introduced in the top layer to analyze the potential risks that the activities can cause. The BRG model is able to classify the user activities into three levels (static, dynamic, and behavior) and can dynamically evaluate the potential risks that caused by user activities; and 3) a node mapping scheme is proposed that can map the HMMs in the bottom layer to the Bayesian nodes in the BRG model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the related works and Section III details the hybrid Bayesian risk model. In Section IV, the risk evaluation framework is proposed based on the Hierarchical HBRG model for social networks. Section V concludes this paper with a summary and discussion.
II. RELATED WORKS
The social network platforms afford users both opportunities and risks. In 2016, social network platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube made strenuous efforts to purge risky social networking practices to ensure users' safety on social networks. More than 3 60 000 malicious or inactive accounts have been suspended. Recently, a lot of research efforts have been made on investigating novel research problems and challenges in security risks that the social networks are facing. In [17] , a framework is proposed that can separate the spammers and unsolicited bloggers from the genuine experts of a specific domain by using the hyperlink-induced topic search. The proposed framework is able to help recommendation system and alike services to identify bloggers; however, it is unable to do more deep investigation, such as event tracking, social network forensics, and timeline matching, which are important in forensic analysis and risk evaluations. Li et al. [18] presented a profile matching schemes for social networks named Scalable and Privacy-preserving Friend Matching protocol. This scheme can provide a scalable friend matching and recommendation solutions without revealing the users' personal data to the cloud. In [19] , a social privacy protector is proposed for preserving privacy information in social networks. It is able to identify the fake profile by analyzing the user's friend list. The developed classifier utilizes a machine learning algorithm to identify the fake account by measuring connection strengths of the user with the people in friend list based on a heuristic that considers several features, such as common friends, common groups, common posts, and so on. However, this method is unable to mark the users and it does not take into account the microbloggers that may affect the results.
Recently, with the research progress made in big data analysis, a number of research works have been done on analysis of forensics in social networks. In [20] , a forensics analysis framework is proposed that is able to identify important data sources for automated forensic analysis on social network user data. The proposed identification graph can visualize the identify graph based on the social network data without the collaboration of the social network operators. The proposed framework does not take the effect of neighbor influences in their event tracking. In [21] , coupled HMM model is proposed to describe the temporal activity patterns in social networks. This model is able to accurately learn models with sufficient observations. In [3] , an HMM model is proposed to address the information integration problems.
In our previous works [2] , we investigated the security risks in mobile systems and proposed a multilayered hierarchical Bayesian network [2] . The system is able to dynamically analyze the potential risks in mobile systems by integrating static analysis, dynamic analysis, and behavior analysis in a hierarchical framework. The risks and their propagation through each layer are well modeled by the Bayesian risk graph, which can quantitatively analyze the risks faced by both apps and mobile systems. Raghavan et al. [21] investigated the user activity patterns by using a Markov model methods based on the observed data, and a clustering algorithm is proposed that can group users according to the interaction behaviors. Tu et al. [3] , [22] proposed a collaborative scheme based on hierarchical and hybrid Bayesian networks (HHBNs) to investigate the information integration. The HHBNs are used to analyze a terrorist attack scenario. However, the proposed methods are unable to dynamically analyze the activity pattern on social networks. Riek et al. [8] investigated the cybercrimes in social networks based on a parsimonious model, which is able to identify risk causal factors that reduce users' intention to use online service. Ross et al. [24] proposed a socio-physical approach by taking the joint interaction and integration of social and physical into a system to improve emergency response and preparedness. The proposed methods can evaluate and reduce risks by enabling an informed coordinated response strategy, which is effective for static social activities and physical activities; however, it is unable to deal with the dynamic user on social networks.
It is clear that a good model of user activity can be very helpful for analyzing the risks and security threats for the activity patterns in dynamic social networks. In Section III, we will introduce a hybrid model by using the well-developed HMMs and the BRG we have developed previously. The HMMs are able to model complicated dynamic user activity patterns in social networks; meanwhile, the BRG can model the causal factors of potential risks caused by these activity patterns.
III. HYBRID BAYESIAN RISK MODEL

A. Threats and Risks in CPSS
As mentioned earlier, the social network platforms are free to use for users, in which the risk management and evaluation are critical but inadequate for the incredible resources. Most of the social network platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc., are using proactive risk management and evaluation scheme to monitor users anomalous activity based on the behavioral analysis and clustering algorithms [4] , [5] , [7] . The attackers or potential criminals may also continuously explore the vulnerabilities by mixing various attack techniques, such as Profile attacks, Scamming, Fake apps, Like jacking, and so on. In many cases, the attackers can collect sensitive privacy information from users' profile by combining different pieces of information in many different ways. Generally, we can group the possible attacks into two categories: 1) vertical attacks that focus on a specific social network site or specific user and 2) horizontal attacks, which focus on the crosscorrelation networks to mine the sensitive information that might be useful for committing attacks. The information might come from multiple different sources (such as social networks, emails, IoT, interested forums, and so on). The dumpster diving attack is a typical horizontal attack, in which an attacker can crosscorrelated and complement the attributes of a user's profile by mining his/her different profiles in other social networks, posts, and replies for posts.
Typical features of social networks include free webspace, building profiles, building conversations/content, messengers, creating pages, and so on. These features introduce new threats/risks like social network worms (such as Koobface), botnet, hijack, phishing scams, trojans, shortened links, data links, and advanced persistent threat. In fact, in social networks, these threats/risks are no longer a single type of attacks. It becomes a security attack scheme by integrating data collection, processing, data mining from numerous internal and external sources in a real-time way. The attacks might be systematic and occur rapidly. Therefore, the security analysis and risk evaluation schemes for the social networks should be able to provide a comprehensive and rapid response. It is necessary to develop a security risk/threat analysis model by incorporating the social network influence as perceived by the users, which should be designed to be able to identify the major factor leading the security risks in real time.
B. Hybrid Bayesian Risk Model
The hybrid Bayesian risk model has a two-layer and interconnected architecture as shown in Fig. 1 . Basically, the hybrid Bayesian risk graph (HBRG) model consists of an HMM layer and an interconnected Bayesian risk graph (BRG) network. In the bottom layer, the HMM is used to model the activities of a user in the dynamic social network, which describes the states, observations, and the aggregation of influences of neighboring nodes. In Fig. 1 , we have multiple HMMs and each might represent different activities that correspond to a node in BRG layer. The HMM is powerful for modeling users' activity evolution in social networks according to a Markov chain with a hidden state that is influenced by the collective activity of the neighboring of the user. Meanwhile, the BRG network (also known as risk causal network) is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of featured risks and their conditional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph (DAG) [2] . In the HBRG model, the nodes represent the risks and the links between the nodes, and the layers represent probabilistic causal dependencies.
1) HMMs:
The HMM is powerful for modeling sequential states [3] that has been widely used in network activities modeling. Since the user activity in social networks has distinctly non-Poissonian characteristics [3] , [21] , furthermore, the activities of neighboring users (followers, friends in social network) can significantly affect user activity, the HMM can well describe the user activity and explicitly take into account the interaction between the users by introducing a coupling between two stochastic processes. The works in [3] and [24] [25] [26] [27] show that the coupling HMMs can well model a probabilistic process of status and the interactions between these activities. In fact, in social networks, the user activity has the following features: 1) the activity of users are dynamic; 2) the individual activity may be preferentially affected by other linked users (such as followers, friends, or even some unlinked users); and 3) the states of users are unobservable. The HMM is able to model the hidden states, which correspond to different patterns in user activity. In social networks, the state transition can be influenced by its neighbors and it is possible to explain the observed data and predict the future activity of a user [21] . With a learning model, the HMM can cluster users and find the resulting cluster structure allowing intuitive characterisation of the users in terms of the interaction dynamics between a user and his/her social network.
In this paper, the user dynamic activity in a social network can be modeled by the following three components: 1) user states; 2) observation density; and 3) influence of neighbors. We use a three-tuple Let Q i ∈ {0, 1}(i = 1, . . . , N) denote the states of a user, Q i = 0 means it is in inactive state at period τ i , and Q i = 1 means it is in an active state. It is clear that the state of Q i is dependent only on Q i−1 , and we have
and
in which p 0 and q 0 denote probabilities from the inactive state to the activate state.
Definition 2 (Observation):
In social networks, the user states are unobservable, the observations T = {τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ N } are a series of activities among suspicious users, tweets, and things with a time stamp associated with each link between two entities in social networks.
Definition 3 (Influence of Neighbors Z):
In addition to Q i−1 , the evolution of Q i is also influenced by other users in social networks (such as friends, followers, etc.) through activities such as post, reply, like, retweet, comment, and so on.
In this paper, we use Z i represent the influence of the neighbors, which can be described as
in which φ(Z ) : Z → [0, 1] is assumed as the simplified capture of the evolution of Q i .
Since Z i is a function of the activity of all the neighbors, assume that Z i is dependent on Q i−1 from its past history; however, it is related to Z i−1 . Then, we have
Equation (4) presumes that user aggregation decorrelates Z i from its past history. Each HMM provides new information corresponding to the node in the Bayesian networks and saves the influence results back into the network. It can be seen that according to T i and Z i , we can forecast T i+1 , it is of immense significance in tasks such as potential attacks, advertising, anomaly detection, etc., in social networks. A simple a posteriori (MAP) predictor of the form [3] 
More details about the HMMs optimisation and prediction can be found in [28] . In the model, each HMM corresponds to a node in BRG and the observation can directly be updated using the prior probability. In social networks, the observation T might be imperfect, and in practice, some new approaches can be used (such as data mining, etc.) to improve the parametrized HMMs.
2) Bayesian Risks Graph Model: In our previous work [2] , [29] , we described a multilayer Bayesian risk graph model that consists of three layers and each of them forms a DAG based on the featured risks. The link between the nodes denotes the probabilistic causal dependencies and each node maintains one or more conditional probabilities table (CPT). In this paper, we applies similar scheme but the nodes can maintain dynamic CPT(s). The interconnected BRG contains three subnetworks: 1) intranetwork; 2) internetwork, covers the connections between two adjacent networks; and 3) crossnetwork, the links between behavior network and static network. Virtual nodes can be added between the crossnetwork and internetwork to reduce the relation space and computation complexity.
In HBRG, the HMMs can estimate the transition probabilities of risks in CPTs as described earlier. The sophisticated HMMs can provide accurate CPTs evaluation to test whether a risk can cause other effect or make contribution on other risks. In this paper, we use the Twitter data set to statistically learn risk features at the static, dynamic, and behavioral networks to build accurate CPTs.
In Fig. 1 , a typical hierarchical Bayesian risk graph (HBRG) is proposed, which integrates a hierarchical risk analysis architecture into a Bayesian risk graph. Fig. 2 shows an example of HMM, where Z i denotes the aggregated activity of neighboring nodes. Fig. 3 shows a two-layer HBRG model, in which the top layer, BRG layer, addresses a Bayesian risks graph (BRG) that can provide a friendly risk evaluation framework. Nodes at different levels are named with different, for example, we use B no denote behavior nodes, D no denote dynamic node, and S no denote static node, respectively. The HMM layer in the bottom can well describe the dynamic temporal patterns of user activity in social networks.
In social network risk modeling, one or more vulnerabilities may cause more than one threats (risks). The risk states or its propagation are usually constructed as a Bayesian graph model G = {V, E}, where V and E denote variable risks and links between risks, respectively. The edges in G can be modeled with local conditional probability distributions. For a node v ∈ V, a conditional probability distribution P(v|Pa(v)) is used to describe the transition.
The process that one or more vulnerabilities propagate to one (or more) different threat(s) could be defined as a dependence graph. The risk states or its propagation are usually constructed as a DAG and the transition between nodes could be modeled with local conditional probabilities. In social networks, the BRG can model, analyze, and predict risks. Table) : In a BRG, one needs to specify the qualitative parameters. Each node maintains a dynamic CPT to describe the conditional probability distribution for a particular combination of values of its parental nodes.
Definition 4 (Dynamic Conditional Probability
Definition 5 (Hierarchical Risk Template):
In social networks, we group the risks into following three categories. 1) Behavior Risk: It includes social network behaviors that might cause potential attacks, or privacy leakage, etc., such as profile collections, tweets mining, and so on. 2) Dynamic Risk: It involves potential activities that attempt to compromise security in social networks. 3) Static Risk: It includes the potential risks and threats based on the static analysis, such as malware, size analysis, permission analysis, virus matching, and so on. The risk template provides BRG a template that describes the basic potential risks of an activity profile in social networks.
The independent influence can be modeled as
in which P(Q) denotes the prior probability of states and P(τ ) the posterior probability of observations. The aggregated influences can be modeled as
It is clear that the causal risks could be a compound of a set of attacks. To well model the joint effect of risks in social network, a risk classifier is effective. There are many types of attacks that can occur in a certain social network process. In HBRG, we model them as behavior risks. We use the observation (Obsv) to determine which risk or attack occurred. In a dynamic social network, it is difficult to determine which attack occurred, since each attack can cause any value of Obsv. However, we can use the Obsv to determine the most likely event that occurred and we return that as an answer.
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT WITH BRGS
IN SOCIAL NETWORKS As discussed before, the proposed HBRG model is able to model the risks in social networks. In this section, a specific scenario is proposed to demonstrate the effectiveness of HBGR by analyzing security issues in online social networks. In this paper, we use the "Chorus-Cable and Data Technologies" to collect data through the Twitter stream air position indicator (API) based on a set of keywords. The keywords are derived from the "user activity profile," and a list of "cybersecurity terms" [2] , [3] , [21] . 1) Keywords: In practice, the security keywords can be extracted based on a trained security vulnerability keywords extractor (SVKE). The SVKE can be trained using text from security blogs, common vulnerabilities and exposures description, official security bulletins, and so on.
2) Filtering and Cleaning Data:
The tweets data should be preprocessed using a security filter. In this paper, we collected many tweets with embedded links from January 6, 2017 to January 17, 2017. The reason that most spam and malicious messages are sent out with embedded links. The collected tweets are preprocessed before the analysis. Two methods are used to identify malicious tweets: 1) the trend microweb reputation blacklist and 2) we use keywords developed in Section II. The tweets are analyzed by extracting fields Content, Links, Hash tags, Sender data, and its frequency. 3) Probability: The above-mentioned HMM model is used to model the dynamic user activity profile. The states of user are unobservable and the observation is based on these activities. The basic idea is to use fake Like buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons that install malware, spreading attacks. This attack attempts to get user to copy and paste JavaScript, or a link into their browser is a big scam warning sign.
A. Attacks in Social Networks
2) Fake Plug-in/Sharing/Offer Scams: In social networks, the users can be tricked into downloading fake browser extensions that can pose like legitimate extensions but stealing data, including passwords, auto-filled form, and other information from the infected system. This kind of scams can be spotted if they offer to provide additional features, fake offers, or messages, to trick users to install fake plug-in, extension, or join a fake event, or group on the social network.
3) Fake Apps: Fake apps have risen since 2013. The apps appear to be legitimate but often they contain some malicious payload that purported to convince them, it could be used to harvest data, aggressive advertising tactics to sell the user's data, browsing habits to a third-part advertising network, and so on.
4) Malware Attacks:
It comes in many shapes, sizes, and purposes ranging from viruses, spyware, and bots. In this attacks, the malware can either be infection or concealing, the former malware can spread and replicate itself from one users to the next. The concealment malware includes Trojan horses, rootkits, backdoors, and keylogger, and so on. The Cross-Site Scripting attack (cross-site script) can force a user's web browser to execute an attack's code.
5) Phishing Attacks: It attempts to obtain sensitive information such as passwords, usernames, credit card details, etc., for malicious reasons. The phishing attacks always connect to account hack, spamming links, malicious URL, retweets, and so on. The activity was tied to a hack, resulting in hundreds of identical states updates to particular band profiles. The resulting activity includes reentering the log information (usernames, passwords), receiving volumes of spam within the accounts.
6) Evil Twin Attacks Namely Impersonation: This kind of attacks is increasing in social networks. It impersonates users while using that profile for financial gain, defamation, cyberbullying, physical crimes, and personal identifiable information gathering. A user can protect its account by settings or networking configurations such as Twitter has which has four privacy levels.
7) Identity Theft: It is becoming an increasing attack in social networks since it is easier to perform but very dangerous. The identity theft is related to attacks such as dumpster diving, account hijacked, profile theft, email scams, and password reusages.
8) Cyberbullying or cyberharassment:
It is on the increase in social networks, especially among child, preteen, or teenagers. The cyberbullying behavior can include unlike informations, such as pages, images, links, or behaviors such as posting rumours, threats, disclose victim's privacy, pejorative labels, and so on. This attack is always tied to attacks such as identity theft, fake scams, and so on.
9) Physical Threats:
The on-line attacks can put people in physical risks. An attacker can gain access through technical means and physical means by bypassing security control, such as leakage of proprietary information, gain access, block social network, and so on.
An attacker can combine the above-mentioned attacks to perform a complicate attack by behavior analytics, automation, machine learning, and other intelligent capabilities that have the ability to do really complex math in a millisecond are just a few layers needed to detect and prevent identity fraud.
B. Number Results
Based on the collected Tweets, we summarized the possible attacks and causal in Table I , in which the first column When all causal attacks happened, the probability of Fake Follower Attacks happens.
addresses the main risks in this data set, the second column addresses the possible causal or linked attacked, and the third column addresses the atom risks that cannot be divided further. Based on this table, a CPT can be easily set up.
In this example, the probabilities of attacks Profile attack, Like jacking, Information gathering can be derived according to the model in Section III. A CPT can be set up and the probability of Fake Follower happened can be derived as shown in Fig. 4 , in which the probability of Profile attack happened is {high : 30.7%, mi ddle : 49.1%, low : 20.7%}, the probability of attack like jacking found is about 56.6%, and the Information gathering happened with a set of probabilities {content : 24.8%, f eatures : 35.6%, f requency : 39.5%}, then the probability of attack Fake Follower happened is 58.9%. Fig. 5 shows the risk and attack analysis for the collected data, in which if the attacks such as Profile attack, Like jacking, and Information gathering are confirmed occurred, then the probability that attack Fake Follower happened is 97.3% Fig. 6 shows an example of the CPT at node Fake Follower, which can be dynamically updated by the HMMs. Since in social network risks analysis, the proposed system is able to dynamically analyze the risk and attacks according to the real-time observations. It is also possible to anticipate the risks for next stage according to the collected social network data.
In Fig. 7 , an example is introduced to show how to dynamically evaluate the final risks that an attack happened by Table II : profile attack, like jacking, and information gathering. In the classifier, we defined the experiential rules that can classify the causal attacks based on the observations.
One of the goals of this paper is to obtain a high-level understanding of various types of attacks on Twitter. The proposed model can analyze the risks or attacks from different viewpoints, for example, time ranges, keywords, users, tweets, and so on. Fig. 8 shows the BRG model for risks described in Table I.  Table III gives the test results, in which P(pa) denotes the probability of "Profile Attack," P(lj) denotes the probability of Like jacking, and P(ig) denotes the probability of Information gathering. The P(FF) denotes the probability that "Fake Follower" happened. It can be seen, in round 1, when all three attacks happened, the probability of "Fake Follower" happened is 97.3%. From round 2 to round 6, we tested how the P(FF) changed when P(pa), P(lj), and P(ig) changed.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper proposed an HBRG model for risk analysis in social networks, which can take risk analysis based on the dynamic activity patterns. The proposed model integrates the HMMs and Bayesian risk graph model to provide real-time risk evaluation. It can also retrieve the causes of attack or foresee potential attacks in the dynamic networks. We are continuing to refine the HBRG model to further improve its performance.
